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Background 
 General reform of the economy of the People’s Republic of China began in the mid 
1980s as a reluctant retreat from the old style command and control economy toward a market 
based economy.  Reform was driven by the growing recognition that state socialist economic 
policy was a failed experience, and would never produce the high levels of economic growth and 
development that would even keep up with population growth, much less permit any extensive 
improvement in China’s economic strength or citizen quality of life. Nor was the Communist 
China Party, (CCP) making a success of the “allocation of scarcity” which is all that their 
economy provided.  Inherent in the centrist state system was the widespread use of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) which were instruments of the government, but supposedly free to operate 
much like independent organizations capable of operating profitably in the realistic world.  But 
SOEs too had proved failed experiences.  Instead of generating revenue for government use, 
most had proved inefficient, and many operated at deficits that had to be underwritten by the 
government, using funds that could be utilized elsewhere.  SOEs carried larger overhead costs 
because they provided many social services to their employees such as housing, health care, 
pensions and elementary/secondary education, and these direct costs drained much of their 
profitability.  
 During the period of the late 1980’s and the 1990’s other major tides reinforced the need 
for urgent reform.  The collapse of the Soviet Union, largely through the failures of its command 
and control economy badly shook Chinese leadership, and helped the reform minded in the Party 
to overcome the inertia and resistance of the older leadership.  The Asian economic crisis of 
1998-1999 resulted in the collapse of regimes in Southeast Asia, and further worried the Chinese 
leadership.  As a result, it further expedited two reactions.  First, it persuaded the leadership to 
divert money from some heavy industrial development for channeling into domestic public 
infrastructure and social services physical plant such as schools and hospitals.  Second, it 
reinforced and galvanized a much publicized anti-corruption campaign driven from the Party on 
down through the national bureaucracy and into the provinces, townships and municipalities.  
Both of these programs were designed to divert growing public distrust.  The Party deliberately 
set out to establish themselves as the “heroes” in the reform of the very corrupt and incompetent 
governance that they themselves had created.  The chosen “villains” were to be the bureaucracy, 
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the provinces and other local governments, and in truth, there were plenty of real villains to 
catch. 
 Finally, the negotiations of the Chinese government to be accepted into the GATT and 
the WTO system made it clear that reform was a pre-condition of that acceptance.  In addition, 
many potential foreign investors also made it clear that their willingness to invest in the Chinese 
economy rested on at least a minimum of reforms that would protect their investment 
commitments.  Deng Xiaoping recognized that there were limits as to what funds could be 
squeezed out of the peasants, and saw foreign direct investment as a vital “shot in the arm” to 
precipitate a development surge.  
 
A Legacy of Neglect 
 In the period from 1985 to 1996, the Party and the central government pressed a process 
of devolution of power and control over many public programs to the provinces and 
municipalities but deliberately withheld the funds that would pay for these programs, telling the 
governors and city councils that they had to find their own sources of funds.  Second, they 
transferred many of the national SOEs into the hands of provincial governors and municipal and 
township/county councils in addition to those already held without the introduction of any real 
controls.  Since these SOEs were often providers of certain social services, this further expanded 
local government roles. Decentralization ended up making everything worse, and the Chinese 
government has been forced to play “catch-up” with its own follies.  An old guard clung to the 
view that centrist control should never be relinquished, and even the reformists were uncertain 
what the disaggregation of power would produce. 
 The failures of the economy have left a huge population of unemployed and 
underemployed.  There is an estimated 180 million people who cannot find work, or are in the 
informal economy, or are unauthorized workers in urban areas, who are in temporary, part time 
or seasonal jobs who seek more permanent employment.  In addition, 10-12% of official workers 
(20-25 million) are unemployed at any given time.i 1 Every level of government is urgently trying 
to find ways to provide job opportunities, but there is increasing concern that development is 
uncontrolled and it is driving up prices, creating problems of overproduction and adding to 
rampant corruption.  And governments face a special dilemma:  even while they are attempting 
to provide jobs, it remains to their advantage to have a pool of cheap labor because it gives them 
an economic advantage, and competition for jobs without socialist fringe benefits keeps labor 
rates low. 
 There are other massive accumulated challenges facing those who are attempting to 
reform governments. By developed country standards, most social programs are pitifully 
inadequate.  Less than 16% of the rapidly aging population has any form of retirement insurance, 
and even when available, insurance provides only about 25% of need.  Only about 14% have 
health insurance, and illness or accident can often drive people into bankruptcy. 2  
Elementary/secondary education is now more fully available, but it still rests too greatly on 
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heavy fees paid by parents.  Most public infrastructure remains seriously inadequate, especially 
in rural and village areas.  Economic development has caused explosive worsening of 
environmental hazards.  China has 16 of the 20 most polluted cities in the world3.  There are 
thousands of areas of very high and often dangerous pollution such as runoffs from industries 
and irrigated fields, mine sites, burning of coal and wood, and heavy river and underground 
water pollution.  Again, the political leadership faces a dilemma:  China uses huge amounts of 
soft coal that is one of the main polluters of the atmosphere.  But if coal use is reduced, the 
Chinese will have to buy more and more expensive oil and gas in an increasingly competitive 
21st century world market. The burgeoning population, the demand for better and more varied 
diets, and the shortage of farm land has ended any hopeful policy of food self sufficiency and 
made China a large scale food importer. 
 Local governments face serious gaps in the social services safety net.  There has been a 
necessary shift of social services from the SOEs to local governments.  But in health care for 
example, 86% of care financing is still by the individual, and 56% of total health care costs are 
patient costs.  There is little provision for public health and sanitation (available to less than 44% 
of the population), clean water is available for only 23% of the people, and the country is highly 
vulnerable to epidemics4.  There are 134 million elderly over 60 in China – the world’s largest 
elderly population5.  
 The cumulative consequences of these long term short comings demonstrate with great 
force the fact that highly centrist and centrally planned and controlled governance simply did not 
work very well.  The CCP is thus being forced to decentralize at least government operations 
whether it wants to or not.  But the CCP and the central bureaucracies are not decentralizing two 
other factors of governance:  central policy and political control, and central bureaucratic control 
by more subtle and indirect means.  The Party and the government are undertaking more realistic 
and desirable policy and funding shifts, but while they brag about the 15-20% of the problems 
they are impacting, they are left with over a billion people whose needs they cannot now 
conceivably satisfy.  Nobody in human history has ever tackled such an enormous task.  
 
Organizational Reforms 
 The Chinese government structure is surely one of the most complicated of any 
government in the world, and one of the most inefficient.  It was allowed to burgeon out of 
control for decades, and it was used to promulgate communist theology, exert centrist control, 
enforce all kinds of extraordinary policies, provide employment for millions of Party members 
and faithful hangers-on, and only secondarily to deliver wholly inadequate public programs. The 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains a whole government-wide top to bottom structure of 
offices independent from the official bureaucracy and vested with almost total control over the 
bureaucracy at all levels down to villages.  At the center is the National People’s Congress 
(NPC), with its executive authority vested in a powerful Central Committee.  The NPC elects 
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China’s President who in turn appoints the Premier, and these two head an elite and all powerful 
State Council. 
 Then there are the official ministries – currently 20 of them – which view themselves as 
“in charge” of their sectors of the economy and society.  Most ministries then supervise a 
complex substructure of State Owned Enterprises (SOE) plus what are generally called Public 
Service Units (PSU) which are a large range of enterprises serving public purposes such as 
technical schools, hospitals, engineering organizations and many others.  The reform, 
rationalization and divestiture of SOEs has been one of the most important and most traumatic 
structural modifications, since it involves creation of a great deal of unemployment, and the 
transfer of their social services roles to local governments.  
 This array of institutions established at the national government level is usually repeated 
down through a hierarchy of provinces, counties, townships, municipalities and villages, with 
each lower level accountable to the one above it. 
 As with most governments, there is a group of “cross-cutting” agencies with government-
wide authority such as the Ministry of Finance (revenues and budgets), the People’s 
Procuratorate (law enforcement), the court system, a National Audit Office, a National 
Development and Reform Commission, and a special commission to supervise state owned 
assets. 
 Since about the mid-80s, it has been one of the most significant and persistent patterns of 
reform to “rationalize” this huge, complicated and wasteful institutional architecture, and it is 
clear that, in structural terms, decentralization is winning out over the older yearning for central 
control.  More than 200 subunits of government have been eliminated in the central ministries 
alone.  The top down grip on even the most routine processes and procedures has been broken, 
and there is a new willingness to permit decentralization of operations.   
 In addition, a series of special task forces has been making serious assessments – often 
for the first time – of bureau operations, and thousands of them have proved to be unauthorized, 
improper, unneeded, obsolete, harmful, time consuming and thus easily terminated without 
adverse consequences.  This in turn facilitated another major goal of reform:  the downsizing of 
the bureaucracy.  There had grown up a huge “redundancy factor” – that is, people on the payroll 
with no “real” jobs.  Much of this redundancy was politically inspired as a form of patronage and 
reward for the faithful.  By eliminating this redundancy, rationalizing the structure, cleaning up 
process waste, duplication and overlap of functions, at least 1.8 million people were removed 
from the roles with little impact on agency performance6.  These reforms were accompanied by 
fundamental reforms in the major management systems of the government, discussed later in this 
article.  It should also be noted that a similar program of reform was simultaneously carried out 
in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 
 But one major point must be emphasized.  In the eyes of practiced bureaucrats, it seems 
clear that every single reform activity has been conceived, designed, and implemented in ways 
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that have yielded the greatest power retention by the political leadership.  In fact, many reforms 
have greatly strengthened central power as would “global warming” in the West. 
 
Construction Reforms 
 Of the many reforms that the government has instituted, none has been more necessary 
than in the arena of government contracting, including construction, land use and land leasing, 
and letting of contracts for purchase of goods and services.  Contracting has also been central to 
the abilities of local governments to move state owned enterprises from incompetence and 
financial losses into the realm of profitable operations. 
 But until recently, there was no central set of procurement and contracting regulations.  
Every ministry, province or municipality was left to design its own ground rules, and most were 
seriously bad.  An estimated 5% of the total Chinese government funding for contracting has 
been lost through corrupt or inefficient practices7.  
 In 1998, less than 20% of public projects used public bidding, and even fewer were really 
competitive.  Construction and land use abuses made up a large percentage of all cases of 
corruption.  Funding for public projects were caught up in a vast spider web of conflicting 
political and bureaucratic infighting in the complex network of intergovernmental relations.  
Much of the contracting was between activities owned by the government ministries themselves, 
or controlled though each ministry’s SOEs, and all were engaged in conniving and “gaming” 
both officially and under the table.  There was too much power, too little supervision, and an 
open invitation to corruption and pathological maneuvers.  And much of this corruption was very 
obvious to the public and a major source of distrust and suspicion. Major prime contracts could 
be endlessly subcontracted, and thousands of suppliers of parts, equipment and supplies were 
involved.  There was no central set of procurement regulations; each Ministry, province or 
municipality made up their own, and this led to too much arbitrary, unchecked decision making 
authority.  In the mid-90’s, there were a few huge scandals in construction projects that were so 
publicly visible that it forced the government’s hand.  In addition, the negotiations of the Chinese 
government to be accepted into the GATT and the WTO system were a great stimulus for 
reform.  The Law on Government Procurement was finally enacted in June, 2002, but the 
enactment of a paper law is not the same as enforcement. 
New and more formal bidding processes have been mandated for all phases of contract 
bidding, selection and implementation.  Bidding was required much more through competition, 
and higher standards of bidder competence were required.  Bids from family, friends, or known 
associates of public officials were forbidden.  Public officials were made responsible for any 
failures or corrupt practices – at all levels of activity down to that of suppliers – and for life!  
That is, even years later, if some failure occurred through any pathological cause, officials 
remained liable, even it they were no longer responsible.   
The use of a single enterprise for all phases of major projects has largely been eliminated 
and projects are being broken out into several packages so that each can be competed separately.  
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The very loose and often scandalous use of subcontracts has now been brought under control and 
official oversight and auditing has been extended to them. Inspection offices were mandated at 
local government levels and special tendering organizations have been created in  most of the 
jurisdictions judged to have the worst problems. Also, there has been serious concern about the 
often incestuous and corrupt relationships between government officials and SOEs under their 
authority.  Too many contracts had been going to “friendly” SOEs in the same political 
jurisdiction.  As a result, there has been a forced divestiture of SOEs in the construction industry 
out of the hands of government agencies that were letting contracts, and the State Economic and 
Trade Commission has adopted the Ministry of Finance procedures and applied them to SOEs.  
Also, the construction markets were “nationalized”; that is, bids were opened up to bidders 
outside of the contracting jurisdiction – this was a means to defeat this regional/local incest. 8 
 Almost all land in China continues to be owned by the government at all levels.  A 
pattern of pathology was readily apparent: favoritism, nepotism, subsidy, bribery, opaqueness, 
etc.  The national government had several elements that were involved in land use policy and 
oversight, including the Ministry of Land Resources, the State Development and Reform 
Commission, the Ministry of Supervision, and the National Audit Office.  As with the approach 
to reform of contracting, these agencies combined in 1999 to 2001 to form hundreds of special 
joint task forces to investigate land use abuses.  They uncovered more than 700,000 cases of 
abuse (in other words, everybody!)  And as with contracting, the fundamental basis for reform 
was established in a new Law of Land Management.  Major reforms include the investigation 
teams mentioned above, a mandated shift from arbitrary administrative decisions to wider use of 
public tendering and formal bidding processes for the use of land, and the installation of a public 
auction process for many large land development projects.  Some of the results of the 
investigation teams were converted into a wave of high visibility prosecutions, including top 
officials such as provincial governors, head of land allocation agencies, and even Communist 
Party officials.  Investigators also determined that some of the authorized uses of public land 
were illegal.  These were terminated or re-competed, and land use laws are being modified.  It 
was also found that, in addition to corrupt practices, many expensive licenses, approvals and 
waivers had been established, solely for the purpose of raising revenue for local governments or 
as leverage for soliciting bribes or kickbacks. 
This whole system of reform has subsequently been extended to mineral rights 
exploration, extraction, transfers of mining interests, export licenses, and other allocations of 
public goods. 
Results in the central government under the new systems are very impressive.  In 1998, 
cases of various corrupt practices resulted in 3.1 billion yuan recoveries.  By 2000, this figure 
was 65.3 billion, and by 2001, it rose to over 150 billion.  While these numbers show 
“accomplishment”, they also show how enormously wide-spread and sloppy the whole field of 
contracting had been.  
In total, it is estimated that about 10-11% of allocated funds were saved.  73% of major 
procurements are now under some form of central control, and this was during a period when 
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total procurement volume rose more than 50%.  However, thousands of smaller procurements at 
all levels of government have yet to be effectively reached. 
 
Regulatory Reforms 
           Throughout the world there has been an upsurge of government regulation – both 
legitimate and not.  The main emphasis has been to create or rewrite a body of regulations that 
enable the functioning of a market based economy, and facilitates rather than opposes the 
operation of private enterprises.  Another purpose is to abandon pre-approvals of thousands of 
activities and shift to an “as needed” enforcement after the fact of new and more explicit 
regulations.  But each new arena of regulation (e. g. environmental issues) seems magically to 
result in more power to the government. This is in part an exercise of the “regulatory mind” at 
work, but mostly it is an older traditional reliance on regulation as the means to enforce the will 
of the government.  When combined with “vertical administration” it gives each level of 
government powerful tools to control and interfere with the activities of subordinate 
governments and all forms of enterprises. Vertical administration means that the lower level of 
government reports to, and is supervised by the next higher level – villages to townships, 
townships to counties, counties to provinces, and provinces to the central national government.  
It all sounds so bureaucratic and innocuous that few recognize its power as a control mechanism. 
So, the rhetoric promises decentralization, but the reality is sustained control of whatever is 
critical to the government, and the list grows every decade. 
  The Chinese Constitution was amended in 1999 to emphasize the rule of law.  It was 
amended again in 2004 to provide explicit language to define and protect private property rights.  
This preoccupation with economic development had meant that many health and safety 
regulations have been neglected but the SARS scare and the huge public disgust that it 
engendered has pressured the CCP to now put together a new concentration on health and safety 
regulation. 
 In recent years, the CCP has announced what it purported to be a major change in their 
philosophy of governance:  a shift away from total top down “totalistic administration” (i. e. 
control) to a new philosophy of the “rule of minimalism.”  Yet all proposed laws or amendments 
are still tightly controlled within the apparatus of the CCP.  The Administrative Licensing Law 
mandated a requirement that any regulation or administrative procedure must have a basis in 
enacted law.  The new legal constraints on the exercise of government power often still remain to 
be adequately applied, in large part because of the extreme gap between the hopeful language of 
the new laws, and the practical resistance of officials who face a loss of power.  Nor is there 
adequate oversight being exercised.  Despite some well publicized cases, few officials have been 
removed or reprimanded.  Few officials have any strong urge to adhere to the legal base, and 
judges and prosecutors are too few and poorly trained.  Although the CCP likes to advance itself 
as the “heroes” of a reform movement, it now lacks the drive and leverage to impose the new 
rules on 725,851 local units of government.   
However, legal restraints on the arbitrary exercise of government power often remain 
weak in practice, and there is a serious shortage of officials to enforce them.  Legislatures have 
little real power and are often packed with CCP loyalists. A long history of legislative drafting in 
                                     Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Summer 2008, Vol. 3, No. 2, p72-89 78 
The Chinese Government: Central Control vs. Decentralization 
the back rooms of the CCP restricts the idea that openness is possible.  Access to the inner circles 
of policy formulation is often available only to special interests with good contacts in the Party 
of the ministries, and not to the general public.   Courts lack jurisdiction and appear to have been 
kept deliberately weak with poorly trained judges and lawyers, corruption, a low level of legal 
consciousness among government officials and the citizens.  There are few reported examples of 
any law or regulation having ever been overturned. In short, the separation of powers as 
understood in the West is simply not accepted. 
There have indeed been drastic reductions in the total number of approvals, through 
efforts led by a newly created Administrative Approval Systems Reform Office, reporting 
directly to the State Council.  In its review of 65 central government ministries and other bodies, 
it abolished 1,795 approval requirements – almost half of the total of more than 4,0009. It often 
turned out that, when the work of government units was more closely evaluated, it was found 
that many units and most of their regulations were useless and were eliminated.  There seems to 
be some greater willingness by agencies to publish advanced notices of rulemaking, but that 
willingness is still spotty and not mandated.   
Many of these abolitions have been of major importance.  Almost all rationing and price 
regulations have been eliminated as vestiges of the old discredited socialist control philosophy.  
The whole arena of imports and exports has been modernized to facilitate economic 
development.  Hundreds of local government regulations have been terminated where their only 
justification was to collect a fee.  Other examples of activities no longer requiring central 
approval include urban infrastructure construction projects; agriculture, forestry and water 
reservation projects not using central government funds; real estate development and 
construction, and “social projects” at the local government level. 
 By 2003, new laws had largely limited regulations are administrative procedures to the 
following: 
 a. Activities directly concerning national security, public safety, macroeconomic control, 
environmental protection and health and safety of lives and properties. 
 b. Natural resources controls, allocation of public resources, and market entry in certain 
industrial sectors that significantly impact “the public interest”. 
 c.  Professions that provide service to the general public. 
 d.  Equipment, utilities and products involved in the above. 
 e.  Validation of the qualifications of entities (e. g. proposed stock issues). 
 f.   Any other activity where the law requires some approval. 
 Only the NPC, the State Council and local People’s Congresses have the right to 
determine whether an approval is required..  Approvals not in line with these rules were 
automatically abolished as of July 1, 2004.  While the Constitution provides for citizen rights to 
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criticize the government, in reality, they are not allowed to challenge acts or decisions with 
general applicability. 
 
Civil Service Reforms 
Every government entity was guilty of excessive growth and heavy staff redundancy, and 
millions of people did not have real jobs and wouldn’t know how to do them if they did.  Almost 
any government official could create a bureau, an SOE or a PSU, many of which were foolish, 
wasteful or unwarranted.   Jobs were justified either through socialist zeal for control or as a sort 
of unemployment program.  As a result, after fumbling for years, the central government finally 
initiated a serious program of reform in 1998 which was based largely on rationalization, 
removal of unauthorized units and personnel, elimination of duplication and overlap, and 
elimination of highly wasteful processes and procedures.  This program extended as well to PSU 
and even the CCP’s own offices.10 By 2002, this rationalization program had trimmed authorized 
staff size in all government and government-sponsored mass organizations by 1.15 million 
including 890,000 in municipal, county and township levels.  In addition, local government at the 
municipal, county and township levels also laid off 430,000 employees not on the authorized 
staff list.  Then of course, since many government units are doing the same things with far fewer 
employees, their managers are bragging about how they have greatly enhanced productivity! 
 The CCP continues to have its own political structure paralleling the official governments 
at all levels down to the 679,000 villages11, and it continues to appoint or approve almost every 
senior public official at all levels.  In some cases however, civil service reform has led to a 
loosening of political intervention (including patronage) at second and third levels.  Another 
element of reform has been the almost unique policy of mandatory rotation of senior and some 
middle level officials (30% a year in some cases, with a target of 95% rotation within 5 years) 
from one province or township to another.  The official stated purpose of these forced rotations is 
to reduce the likelihood of embedded corruption, but it is recognized that another purpose is to 
break up strong local and regional power bases.  The unsavory record of governments has bred 
greater public awareness and resentment, and local CCP political overseers have had to upgrade 
their own involvement. 
 There are many other forms of civil service reform that parallel those found in other 
countries.  All positions must now be authorized, with job descriptions and definitions of 
required skills or experience.  A growing number of such positions now require taking a 
competitive and/or competency examination to qualify for application.   Position vacancies must 
now be published, and usually applicants must be solicited from outside of the organization to 
avoid favoritism and bureaucratic incest.  This became critically important following the 
mandatory downsizing and restructuring because there had been thousands of situations where 
existing employees had to compete with each other for a limited number of remaining jobs, 
especially at the middle and upper management levels.  This had led to an ugly upsurge of 
bribery and kickbacks.  The evaluation of employee performance is still infrequent and 
rudimentary, and the evaluation of organizations against their own objectives is still very risky 
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because negative evaluation might be interpreted as illegal criticism of the government.   Salaries 
and wages are still relatively low, although they have been raised a great deal in the last few 
years.  In some cases, there remain such hidden values as provided housing, tax reliefs, or 
furnished autos.  Salary improvements have not seemed to stem the zest for corrupt income. 
Nevertheless, China has made major improvements in “Civil Service” reform in the last 4 years. 
 
Local Government Reform 
 General administrative expenditure as a percentage of total government budgets rose 
from about 5% in the 1970’s to 15% in the 1990’s.  This is still very low, and it shows what has 
been the almost total neglect of local governance.  Even the 5% was largely wasted on huge 
staffs of uneducated poorly trained workers, and the increase to 15%, is wholly inadequate to 
catch up with past neglect of social services needs, much less to deal with rapidly rising costs, 
unfunded mandates from the central government or the provision of badly needed new services. 
 When the central government fobbed off many of its loss-making SOEs onto local 
governments, they had little choice but to use public funds to upgrade these enterprises and try to 
make them profitable.  To an amazing extent, they have succeeded.  Many SOEs are wholly 
owned by the government.  In addition, land ownership and leasing plus use of public funds for 
development makes local political leaders “quasi-owners” of many more.  Local governments 
are, of necessity preoccupied with their own problems, could care less about Beijing, and are 
very defensive and “status quo” about reforms pushed from the center.  Regionalism is 
important.  Provinces/municipalities band together, often against the central government.  Much 
of the political power is still very arbitrary and self serving as opposed to a “public service” 
orientation. 
 The People’s Armed Police is a relatively new national police, controlled by the PLA, but 
in part financed by local governments.  It is an outgrowth of two things:  the need to trim down 
the PLA, and the fears generated about civil unrest after Tiananmen Square.  Thus, the justice 
system features powerful central military and police forces while regular police at the local level 
are weak, understaffed, lacking in authority, and frequently corrupt.  They are often drawn into 
connivance with local corrupt politicians.  The weak courts are much the same. 
 Land ownership continues to be a powerful tool – for revenue, for legitimate control of 
growth patterns, for leverage on people and organizations, and as a source of corruption. 
 The collapse of central planning was highly desirable and is not being missed, but it did 
create a vacuum.  The result was dis-aggregation to local governments.  While desirable, it 
frightens the central government, and there are many kinds of efforts under way to regain control 
at the center through administrative means. 
 As with the Soviet Union, decentralization/devolution shifted many public services from 
SOEs to local governments.  As local governments inherited “loser” SOEs, they had to strip out 
the social services and create stronger government entities to manage them, and find funds to 
upgrade and modernize the SOEs as producer enterprises.  
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 Many of the SOEs were undermined because political attention was concentrated on them 
as producers, and nobody understood the markets which they were supposed to serve.  SOEs had 
an inadequate understanding of what  consumers wanted, nor were they willing to make an effort 
to meet those needs even if they understood. Manufacturers who got bonuses for maximizing 
production soon found that they were filling up warehouses with products that could not be sold.    
There was a similar arrogance about the use of price controls, which were almost universally 
recognized as dumb policy.  It took the Chinese well into the mid-1990s to learn this lesson.  As 
they eliminated price controls and other subsidies to SOEs, they then began to realize how 
excessively weak they were, and how unprepared they were to face international competition. 
 Thus, a program of divestiture of SOEs became absolutely critical, despite the prospects 
of a serious surge of unemployment, and considerable loss of “face” for the CCP.  At the 
beginning of the divestiture program, the central government owned about 4700 SOEs and local 
governments about 83,000.12  At present, the national government retains direct ownership of 
fewer than 1,000 SOEs with a far larger number now owned or controlled by local governments.  
Control is achieved by the retention of strong equity positions in thousands of others which can 
be sufficient to provide effective control.  In addition, the State has many tools to exercise de 
facto control over any enterprise if it chooses to do so. These forms of control include numerous 
regulations, control of bank loans, or cancellation of land leasing contracts.  In addition, the 190 
retained SOEs tend to act like central holding companies which have hundreds of subordinate 
SOEs or contractors under their control. 
 Divestiture does not necessarily mean privatization.  Many of the SOEs that have been 
retained tend to be the largest and most powerful enterprises that are at the heart of the Chinese 
economy such as steel, gas and oil, energy production, communications, transportation, and 
banking.  Many of these enterprises have been restructured and rationalized to make them more 
competitive in the international market place.  In other cases, SOEs have been retained but have 
been deliberately partnered with some private sector company which can bring money, 
technology and/or management skills to the partnership.  In still other cases, the principle 
divestiture technique has been to force some form of “mergers and acquisitions” which can 
streamline whole industries that have been characterized by too many small inefficient units.  For 
example, there were more than 30,000 small coal mines throughout China, and these are either 
being closed down or combined into perhaps 200 remaining enterprises.   
 The problems surrounding Public Service Units (PSU) rest more directly on finance.  
PSU are a separate range of institutions serving public purposes, and they are separate and 
distinct from either SOEs or from standard bureaucracies.  Generally they provide social services 
while SOEs provide economic operations.  Today there are more than 1.3 million PSU 
employing more than 25 million people, or one third of the people working in the “public 
sector”.13 Almost all function largely with public money and under standard civil service rules 
and regulations.  Many of them were created haphazardly, with vague or nonexistent rules.  They 
are supervised and largely financed by some government agency, but their costs –and 
responsibilities – have been skyrocketing, and total financing available to PSU now accounts for 
two thirds of total government spending.  PSU thus play a role in China which seems to be a 
                                                 
12 Yang, op. cit. pp.31-53 
13 Ibid.             
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combination of both public and private sector roles in the U. S.  The main thrust of PSU reform 
has been to push them to find sources of funding other than public tax funds, and a good deal of 
progress has been achieved; 20% of them are now self sustaining, and overall, perhaps 50% of 
their total funding is coming from other than official budgets, mostly in the form of charges for 
services. 
 It seems clear that the Chinese government is content with slowly loosening the 
relationships between the PSU and the government.  In some cases, PSU have been 
“commercialized”, although, in typical fashion, government agencies would like to retain policy 
control of some PSU without having to finance them. 
 The CCP is gaining a lot of recognition for their success in selling off these SOEs, and 
yet in thousands of cases the government retains a strong equity position and seeks to use this to 
control the enterprise.  Many foreign investors are not enthusiastic about investing in SOEs in 
which the government – and the Party – have every intention of exercising control and practicing 
political manipulation.  Finally, there have indeed been many thousands of genuine sell-offs, 
either to other Chinese enterprises or to foreign investors, and other thousands of enterprises 
have simply been terminated.  As a result of the exercise of these options, the government has 
done its best to retain employment, but it is estimated that perhaps 35 million workers have been 
displaced, either because their enterprise has been eliminated, or because they proved to be 
redundant, and thus a real threat to the efficiency of the remaining enterprises. 
 
Budget/Finance Reforms 
 The extraordinary wild, chaotic, misguided and mismanaged governments of China were 
perfectly reflected in the financial systems that prevailed for the collection, allocation and 
spending of public money.  Any level of government, and indeed many departments and bureaus 
were essentially free to invent their own financial controls and many were bizarre and 
incompetent.  To begin with, the initial dominant Communist philosophy was that the 
government was the dictatorship of the proletariat, planned and run from the center, and driven 
by communist dialectic of mass struggle and absolute centrist control.  Concepts such as 
managerial efficiency or delegation of authority were suspect and totally abandoned.  Excessive 
control was exercised under the State Plan, which was both a bureaucratic nightmare and the 
victim of the classic political motives of under funding, misallocation of funds, and centrist lack 
of comprehension of reality.  The State Plan was totally misdirected in terms of its long term 
objectives, and was ineffective in the short term as a budget planning system.  By the mid 80s it 
was clear that it had to be abandoned. 
The tax system was also completely chaotic.  It overtaxed some elements of society and 
ignored others.  It was underpowered and could not generate adequate total revenues.  Neither 
the tax structure nor the budget allocation policy were capable of shifting revenues from stronger 
to weaker economic areas.  Local governments were kept deprived of real local taxing power and 
had virtually no discretion over tax bases, rates of taxation or revenue targeting.  Nor did 
governments develop really effective means of collecting taxes, especially from non-government 
organizations.  Local tax rules were easily “interpreted” to favor friends and punish opponents.  
Few governments had any real capability to estimate revenues accurately and this produced 
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many short-fall panics, chaotic reprogramming from year to year, and a persistent shortage of 
revenue even for the most critical of public purposes.  Local officials were often guilty of 
inventing illegal taxes along with various fees and licenses to scrape up revenue wherever 
possible. 
 While the allocation of scarce resources is always difficult and contentious, it seems clear 
now that there were serious misallocations at every government level.  Public spending was far 
too low a percentage of GDP.  Too much was spent on the military and on the huge greatly 
overstaffed bureaucracy.  Even in the 1970’s, and continuing until today, there has been an 
overwhelming dominance of all forms of economic development, which seemed always to win 
out over demands for social services and public infrastructure.  Threats to the environment 
multiplied and became more serious, but were deliberately neglected.  Education, health and 
welfare and retirement benefits still remain seriously inadequate. 
 For many years, local units of government handled their financial transactions simply by 
creating one or more bank accounts with state owned banks.  More than 107,000 such ministry 
accounts were created, each controlled by one or two public officials and almost totally exempt 
from any further outside scrutiny.  Only the controlling officials had any idea what funds went 
into these accounts, and even worse, what came out.  In many cases, withdrawals were made 
without any form of expenditure certification.  In fact almost no government unit had any proper 
accounting system, nor were there any proper forms of budget formulation, allocation or 
expenditure control. 
 One of the fundamental changes in governance that precipitated major budgetary changes 
was the gradual abandonment of the structure of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).  The 
widespread pattern of SOE failure, and the need to prop many of them up with extensive 
government subsidies was a serious drain on the public budget, and this congenital failure did 
much to persuade national leadership that their economic shortcomings could never be solved 
with their existing centrist state socialist economy.  The central government began to dump many 
of the smaller of these deficit SOEs on local governments at all levels for the obvious purpose of 
cutting the losses of the central government.  This meant the acquisition of a huge “unfunded 
mandate” to keep these SOEs afloat, or to get rid of them in some way.  In addition, many of 
these SOEs had been the designated provider of social services for their employees, such as 
elementary and secondary schooling, heath clinics, retirement benefits, and aid to the poor.  It 
became necessary therefore for local governments to detach these social services from the SOEs 
and link them to normally provided social services agencies.  This transition resulted in many 
cases in major reductions in social services.  A high level of education and health care costs had 
to be provided by private expenditure. Associated government organizations such as universities 
or hospitals have been desperate for funds and are trying everything now to raise money.   In 
fact, where the government claims it has increased spending on social programs, much of it has 
been various kinds of off-budget revenue amounting to about 5% of GDP. During the early 
period between 1978 and 1995, central government revenues fell from 35% of GDP to just 11%.  
Recovery from this level has been achieved by a new system of having revenues collected at the 
local level, with a fixed sum for each jurisdiction transmitted to the central government, and the 
locals keeping any excess. 
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 All of this chaos for so many years created major local government debts to banks which 
may or may not ever be repaid.  There are huge unfunded liabilities such as pensions, road 
repairs or environmental dangers that are simply ignored.  These obligations may run as much as 
20-30% of GDP.  Political interference has created vastly overpopulated government staffs, with 
as much as 40% of the staff redundant and without real use.  A lot of money is lost through “tax 
expenditures” both legal and illegal, favoritism in the tax system, and corruption on so vast a 
scale that it seems almost improper to be honest.  Contracts, revolving funds, land leases, rentals 
of public property, inspections, licenses, are all victims of corruption. 
 At the national government level, both a Bureau of Anti-Corruption and Bribery and a 
National Audit Office have been created.  The Ministry of Finance has been given general 
responsibility for development of a broad ranging program of finance and budgeting reform. 
These organization’s roles are fairly new, with limited and ill trained staffs, facing mountains of 
problems. 
Broad measures to reform public finance started with the abandonment of the State Plan, 
both as a strategic document and as the basis for short term budget planning.  In its place is a 
new and more modern budget formulation/execution system has been established, generally 
supervised by the Ministry of Finance including a general oversight role over both the content 
and processes for budget formulation and financial control.  The divestiture of SOEs has largely 
been accomplished, and social services extracted and folded into local government programs.  
Remarkably, many of the “loser” SOEs have in fact been revitalized by local governments.  
Mayors, and county executives and provincial governors have become capitalists and have used 
public tax funds to upgrade these SOEs, often by luring foreign investors to joint venture with 
them.  As a consequence the incomes from these enterprises and the taxes they now pay have 
become very welcome sources of local government revenue. Policies have been initiated to cure 
imbalances in resource allocation.  No governments seem to have lost their zeal for economic 
development investment, but most have learned that they cannot politically continue to ignore 
growing citizen pressure for more adequate social services and public infrastructure.  Most of the 
heavy burden of taxes traditionally leveled on farmers was lifted at last in 2005. 
Local governments are now under a form of contract with the central government where 
they collect the taxes, forward an agreed upon sum to the national government, and are permitted 
to keep any surplus.  Of course, this “revenue sharing fund” is used by the central government to 
keep a grip on local governments by adjusting the amounts to be forwarded and making sure that 
local governments do not become financially too independent.   
Massive reforms have been largely achieved in accounting systems, budget formulation 
practices, and budget review and analysis.  Serious efforts are still under way to capture all 
revenues and expenditures of all government levels into a formal consolidated budget.  
“Reserves for contingencies” were eliminated because they had turned out to be slush funds 
vulnerable to misallocation and corruption.  Almost all of the 107,000 risky local bank accounts 
have been replaced by a centralized fiscal processing system run by the Treasury.   Budgets are 
now prepared in the form of comprehensive organizational accounts and not just by functions 
such as personnel or travel.  A form of zero based budgeting has been introduced, and far greater 
detail is being included in budget submissions.  This system includes pre-approvals of fund 
disbursements, and post-expenditure reconciliation between expenditure approvals and actual 
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disbursements.  In the process, it was found that there were thousands of illicit “loans” between 
banks and public officials that added greatly to the size of public debt.  Special anti-corruption 
measures are being pursued to clean up this mess as part of a broader effort to eliminate 
unauthorized programs, redundant and unauthorized staffing, “ghost” contracts, unsupported 
payments, and unauthorized offices.  As a part of this reform effort, it was found that financial 
transactions on most major public works projects (such as the Three Gorges Dams) were so 
blatantly corrupt that the Ministry of Finance had to take them over and start making direct 
payments, bypassing the supervisory bureaucracies. This has led to a far more serious attitude 
about the use of competitive contracting for most government procurements. 
 In sum, the Chinese government has taken the former financial chaos seriously, and has 
generally made impressive improvements in almost every facet of financial management.  But 
this more disciplined and fact based control has also revealed that the government has incurred a 
huge backlog of contingent liabilities – equal perhaps to as much as 20% of GDP.  Nobody 




 The one topic of reform that must be discussed with great care is political reform.  It 
remains illegal in China to criticize the government at any level, and “criticism” is interpreted 
very broadly.  As with the economic reforms that emerged slowly in the 1980’s, initial very 
guarded notions of political reform are being discussed within the CCP itself.  In general, the two 
main schools of thought are those who favor absolutely no retreat from current practices and 
those who favor some “democratization” but only within the party itself and not in the country.  
But the common and compelling attitude in both schools is that, whatever may be done, it cannot 
be allowed to weaken the political control of the CCP.  Thus, those reforms that have been 
undertaken to date must be assessed in this light.  Many reforms are in fact designed to appear to 
be “democratic” outside of the Party, but in reality are subtle ways to further enhance control.  If 
there are sweeping cuts in the party bureaucracy and some top to bottom rationalization of lines 
of Party authority, the net result appears to be that more power than ever has ascended to the top.  
If there is now some competition for election to top party posts, it is still a small elite group that 
nominates the candidates.  The inner-Party democratization movement announces the birth of 
“accountability” by allowing occasional votes on issues in Party meetings, and the publication of 
more formalized Party procedures.  Many Party organs at all government levels are now 
expected to publish some form of annual report, but they tend to be bland and self-protective.  
Local Party congresses are being urged to meet on some regular schedule instead of a pro forma 
“once each five years” which is the current norm. 
 It is true that there are now many elections at the village level, but this seems to be a 
classic example of how the CCP still thinks.  Village committees are usually informal 
arrangements with little official power.  Elections to these committees has conveyed the 
impression of growing democracy, but it appears that the real power remains where it has always 
been – with the local CCP offices at the provincial, county, township and village level.  
Candidates for village councils must be approved by the local CCP office, and in fact, many of 
the nominations originate there.  In many cases, the election is really to choose 1-2 
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“recommended” candidates and the local Party chief still gets to make the selection.  Thus, the 
appearance of democracy is achieved without any sacrifice of absolute control. 14 
 Further, there is a growing willingness to allow the creation of civic organizations 
ranging all the way from unions, to parent/teacher organizations, professional associations, or 
“cause” groups such as environmentalists or women’s rights groups.  But all of these groups 
must be authorized by the CCP, their plans carefully reviewed, and their activities monitored by 
some designated government department “sponsor”.  At many of their meetings, there will be a 
ministry representative and a CCP representative present.  These groups have some latitude to 
criticize local affairs, but any criticism of the activities of the national government, or any 




 Decentralization really involves four different types of actions: decentralization, which 
means the performance of national government programs at the local government level under 
their own authority: delegation, which means the assignment of central government authority 
either to local units of government ministries or more importantly the delegation of central 
government responsibilities to local governments which must act under central government 
control; devolution, which means the transfer of some responsibility out of the government into 
private hands; and divestiture which is a massive government program to divest itself of 
thousands of state owned enterprises by many means including elimination, consolidation, 
privatization, or transfer to local governments. 
 Decentralization has become the official policy for many types of government 
responsibilities, but it is carefully limited to local program service delivery, and for purely local 
programs of economic development.  These local activities must be performed within broad 
policies set by the national government, and under intense oversight.  These activities are 
predominantly funded from local income including business operations run by local 
governments, often based on locally managed SOEs, but also increasingly on non-government 
activities.  Thus, it seems very apparent that the national government is pursuing a policy of 
“decentralization of operations, centralization of policy”, and it has not changed its commitment 
to centrist control, both political and economic.  It has however become more sophisticated about 
how that control is exercised. 
 The decentralization elements of the reform movement are tightly linked to a collateral 
policy of central government hardening of the instruments of such central control – the tax 
system, approval of budgets and resource allocations, the elaboration of new and more stringent 
laws which magically enhance central authority, and the widening range of government 
regulations, most of which strengthen the authority of central regulatory agencies.  The 
government has placed great stress on the value of “vertical administration” in which each 
                                                 
14 Thornton, John “Long Time Coming: The Prospect for Democracy in China”, Foreign Affairs  Jan/Feb. 2008; 
Shambaugh, David, “China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation”, 2008.  Tsai, Lilly L., op. cit. Chapter 2. 
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agency or program of government must report upward through every level of government is the 
ultimate authorities in Beijing.  
 Delegation of authority or responsibility then, if viewed in this light, is recognized as 
more theoretical than real.  In fact, delegation is in many ways a serious problem.  For example, 
local governments have been “delegated” responsibility to provide local logistical support to the 
regional commands of the People’s Liberation Army.  This is a heavy financial burden which the 
local governments should not have to bear.  Similarly, the central government has attempted to 
delegate responsibility for the enormous problems of environmental hazards, with pitifully 
inadequate funding provided.  The national government may now openly criticize local 
governments for not having solved 60 years of total environmental neglect. 
 The whole idea of devolution seems essentially unacceptable.  CCP leadership still wants 
to constrain the growth of the private sector, because it still has heavy commitments to major 
SOEs and wants to keep as much of the economy in SOE hands which the CCP can more 
effectively control.  However, some public service units are being allowed to escape from the 
government if they can substitute other financial sources for government subsidies. 
 Perhaps the most successful “D” has been the divestiture of state owned enterprises.  It 
has taken great courage and resourcefulness to abandon more than 50 years of commitment to 
this form of organization.  Not only has their been the trauma of confronting the management of 
thousands of SOEs, and the downsizing of millions of workers, but the dramatic shift in policy to 
a market based economy threatened the very rationale of state socialism, and the philosophical 
underpinnings of the CCP itself.  The government seems to be emerging from these problems in 
full control for the very reason that this economic conversion has worked so spectacularly, and 
most Chinese are happy with their new world.   It is ironic that there seem to be very few 
communists left in the CCP, probably fewer than on Ivy League faculties but perhaps they feel 
that the name has ceased to have much meaning as long as the control remains. 
 But the real answer as to the intent of the government lies in two perceptions, one 
political and the other managerial.  Politically whenever the Party has concluded that it had to 
tolerate some change, it has studied the optional ways in which that change could be undertaken, 
and it appears always to have selected the option that results in the least possible loss of centrist 
power.  For example, in the SOE divestiture program, the government never really contemplated 
the full abolition of SOEs.  Instead it worked its way carefully through the options for SOE 
divestiture on a case-by-case basis, industry by industry looking for the “least retreat” choice.  It 
kept all of the really powerful “commanding heights” enterprises, and carefully handed off small 
and medium size enterprise “losers” to provinces or municipalities Others were “corporatized” 
with government retention of a heavy equity interest, or “rationalized” through consolidations 
and mergers.  Others were privatized, have their subsidies withdrawn, or were simply eliminated. 
 Reforms of management systems and procedures were deliberately undertaken so that 
they culminated in a tightening of centrist authority.  The whole concept of vertical 
administration is best understood not as improved management, which it is, but as “strengthened 
control at the top”.  This control was exercised through program channels such as transportation 
which had to report to central government ministries.  At the same time, local administrative 
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officers such as human resources management directors, budget officers or auditors had their 
own upward channels to controllers in Beijing. 
 The growth of the powers of public regulation, and the passage of under girding laws also 
has meant that the range of government authority has been substantially expanded and deepened, 
and the power to enforce has been strengthened and made more legitimate.  It has been possible 
for governments at all levels to eliminate millions of clearances and pre-approvals (e.g. approval 
of marriage licenses) in favor or inspections “as needed” after the fact.  This regulatory authority 
usually now includes powerful authority to investigate, interrogate and seize records. 
 Finally, the CCP has not relinquished its power to control the appointment of public 
officials at all levels down through townships.  This is a party authority and it usurps the normal 
authority of government ministry line managers.  No top official gets appointed, promoted, 
transferred or trained without CCP instigation or approval.  Even in the new environment of 
contested elections at the village level, it would be rare even to nominate candidates without the 
approval of the local CCP office.  If one asks “what is the purpose of having 3.6 million CCP 
organizations in the country?” the answer is that, for good or ill, they exist to deploy the power 
and authority of the Party, and to enforce its will.  Corruption has been called “the kudzu” of 
China.  The CCP has attempted to portray itself as the “heroes” who are going to do away with 
it, but the Party and the government control so many things, and retain so much control that a 
large number of the corrupt officials are “them.” Anti-corruption drives range from sincere to 
sham, and a few arrests of senior officials represent political maneuver rather than real purging. 
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